Theory and Narrative in the History of Technology
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Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4020968 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Scranton (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 385 |
| Publication date | 1991-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Technology and Culture (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-165X • E-ISSN: 1097-3729 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3105717 |
| OpenAlex | W2318494478, W4376544013 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
THEORY AND NARRATIVE IN THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY: COMMENT PHILIP SCRANTON Angus Buchanan’s distress at the character of recent work in the history of technology is palpable. If the enemy is not inside the citadel, he is at least scratching at its doors. His concern for the dubious value of predictive and scientistic theories for historical studies of technol ogy is widely shared, I believe, as is his emphasis on attending to contingency and uniqueness as keys to resisting the lure of various determinisms. Yet I fear that in proposing a swing back toward “critical narrative” Buchanan has created a quite muddled argument, unaware of or inexplicit about its own presuppositions, and thus open to the ripostes John Law delivers. Law, admitting his outsider’s position in historical debates, scores Buchanan for attempting to “legislate” the proper methods of inquiry and for failing to regard his own approach with a critical scrutiny comparable to that with which he examines the social sciences. Although “third voices” in such discussions are expected usually to strike a balance between divergent views, I shall not do so. Buchanan’s essay is so replete with assertions disguised as self-evident truths that its several virtues are over whelmed. The modesty of Law’s response embodies a commendable professional courtesy, but its plea for openness and harmonious intercourse does little justice to the troubled, much-discussed “con vergence” of history and the social sciences over the last several decades. My discontent with each will be apparent shortly. Buchanan well appreciates that a Rankean “as it actually happened” history is a nonstarter. He allows that historians start out with “certain assumptions and perceptions of what is wanted from the evidence.” However, “genuine historical research” must not allow these precepts to “dominate the inquiry.” Such work becomes “academically unac ceptable,” for it takes the form of “partisan history.” At the same time, Dr. Scranton is professor in the Department of History at Rutgers University, Camden. He is the author of Figured Tapestry: Production, Markets, and Power in Philadelphia Textiles, 1885-1941 (New York, 1989), which received the 1990 Taft Prize in labor history.© 1991 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X79173202-0007$01.00 385 386 Philip Scranton Buchanan allows that a diligent and critical author will reach conclu sions that tally “with the overall theoretical assumptions and philoso phy of the historian.” As “this element of personal bias is unavoid able,” it “is therefore acceptable.” Now, this creates a puzzle, both theoretically and practically. Where to draw the line between lying historians and believably biased ones? Between the partisan and the reliable chronicler? Who can draw it definitively? It is irrelevant here to trot out the excesses of Stalinists or apologists for princes, corpo rate or aristocratic. What Buchanan seems to believe plausible is the construction of a theory domination detector that will discriminate between “distortion of the historical account” and some species of accuracy. In the absence of a transcendent canon of objectivity, however, no such durable or reliable detector can be realized. Instead, I would argue, the assess ment of the merit of historical work is situational and dependent in part on the “fit” between the implicit or explicit theorizations the author employs and those on which the reader relies. Because defining any held for study entails a set of theoretical assertions, the judgment as to whether they dominate or inform the narrative text is context dependent, if not subjective at the individual level. Further, histories are not created or evaluated outside history. Even a casual reading of Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream would suggest that the level of “acceptable” bias is related to the “passions of the period” in which studies emerge.1 In turning away from the context of and audiences for historical productions, Buchanan affirms his devotion to the collective project of building definitive narratives. In the case of “the evolution of the bicycle,” he asserts that the work of sociologists Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker “adds nothing to historical knowledge,” obscuring “the reality of the history of the bicycle . . . beneath ajumble of conceptual devices.” However, what constitutes the “reality” of this history is
Aesthetics · Archaeology · Argument (complex analysis) · Art · Epistemology · History of technology · Literature · Narrative · Narrative history · Political science · Scrutiny · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Historical Studies and Socio-cultural Analysis · History · History of Science and Medicine · Law · Philosophy
Hughesian history of technology and Chandlerian business history
On Not Burning Bridges
Good Fortune, Mirrors, and Kisses
Technology, Social Construction of
Theory, Narrative, and Discipline at the Intersections of Science and Technology Studies and History
Butterfield’s nightmare
The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology
Theories of Technological Change
| Citations per year | 0.26 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1992 - 2015 (24) |
| Highly cited | No |