The Revenge of Homo Economicus
Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4029205 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuel Bowle (0000-0001-6068-4430, University of Massachusetts Amherst), Samuel Bowles (Professors of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts.), Herbert Gintis (Professors of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts.) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-102 |
| Publication date | 1993-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.7.1.83 |
| OpenAlex | W2052416029 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 123 |
| References cited | 22 |
Recent developments in microeconomic theory have shown that the self-interested behavior underlying neoclassical theory is artificially truncated: it depicts a charmingly Victorian but Utopian world in which conflicts abound but a handshake is a handshake. But a handshake is not always a handshake. Studies of principal-agent analysis, the economics of information, radical political economy, mechanism design, and transactions cost economics have all focused on the difficulties involved in policing and enforcing the actual process of market exchange. Abandoning the Victorian world of neoclassical theory will redirect economists to an older conception of their profession: what once was called political economy. By taking optimizing more seriously, post-Walrasian economics has inspired a revolution in economic thought fostering both new theoretical departures and alternative conceptions of the capitalist economy. We will offer our own interpretation of this literature, focusing on the widely recognized fact that the terms arising from exchange are not generally enforceable at zero cost to the exchanging parties. Where some aspect of the good or service supplied is both valuable to the buyer and costly to provide, the absence of third-party enforcement of claims gives rise to endogenous enforcement strategies. We refer to this relationship as a "contested exchange" because, unlike the transactions of Walrasian economics, the benefit the parties derive from the transaction depends on their own capacities to enforce competing claims
Economics · Economy · Enforcement · Handshake · Homo economicus · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Transaction cost · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Political Economy and Marxism
International conference “’Between the Carrot and the Stick’
Interview with David Woodruff
Money, Gender, and Power in Households
The Logic of Good Social Relations
Interpersonal Interaction and Economic Theory
Pouvoir, autorité et convention dobéissance
Market Socialism
Contested Exchange Versus the Governance of Contractual Relations
Thinking Outside the Walrasian Box
On Post Walrasian Economics, Macroeconomic Policy, and Heterodox Economics
Darpa's Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence
The New Division of Labor in the Globalized Economy
The elusive market
Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
Democracia, civismo e cinismo. Um estudo empírico sobre normas e racionalidade
Exchange, Action, and Social Structure
Debt, Power, and Crisis
City Requiem, Calcutta
Economics and Social Interaction
Some Concluding Reflections on the Privatization of Common Property Resources
The Property Rights School Solution
The Unregulated Common Property
Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Natural Resources and Economic Growth
Recent Changes Affecting Collective Action at Village Level
The Possibility of Co‐Operation
The Regulated Common Property
Co‐Ordination and Leadership in the Unregulated Common Property
The Tragedy of the Commons
Were People Traditionally Conservationists?
Moral Norms and Co‐Operation
General Conclusion
Co‐Management as a New Approach to Regulation of Common Property Resources
W alras, L eon
Market and Nonmarket Allocation
Governing the Firm
The Market for Force
Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime
Institutions
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources
Poverty and the Politics of Exclusion
Hic sunt leones
The Role of the Law in the American Political Economy
The Political Economies of Red States
The American Political Economy
The economic debate on power
Grandparents Are the Next Best Thing
The Recent Compression of US Wage Inequality
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) on Moulding States
Endogenous preferences
“Be Serious!”
The social bases of a committed labor force
Winners, losers, and efficiency
The Theory of the Labor‐managed Firm
Rationality, Norms and Institutions
Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device
Firms' Market Power, Endogenous Preferences and the Focus of Competition Policy
Theories of the Firm and the Relationship between Different Perspectives on the Division of Labour
Thinking Things Through
Economic sociology as a strange other to both sociology and economics
Warum arbeiten die Arbeiter
Development II
Work intensity, gender and sustainable development
When and how far is group formation a route out of chronic poverty
Environmental Entitlements
Social class and workers’ rent, 1983–2001
Expert communication on Twitter
Behind the market stage where real societies exist ‐ part II
Interlinked contracts and social power
The role of care in creating narratives for sustainability
Past and future adaptation pathways
Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology
Paradoxes of the Market Wars
Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism
Competitive Tendering in Uk Health and Local Authorities
Post-Walrasian Economics
Street‐Level Bureaucrats’ Social Value Orientation On and Off Duty
The Political Economy of Public-Private Compensation Differentials
Indentured clinical labor? An indigenist standpoint view of ‘forced surrogacy’ and reproductive governance in India
From rational actor to efficient complexity manager
Reformulating the foundations of consumer choice theory and environmental valuation
The evolution of environmentally responsible investment
Ecological economics and political ecology
A Critical Review of Homo Economicus from Five Approaches
Transformations in the Meaning of Unemployment
The blind men and the elephant
Does Aggression Deter or Invite Reciprocal Behavior? Considering Coercive Capacity
Rewarding carrots and crippling sticks
The Rational Choice Approach to Human Studies
A economia neoclássica
Neoliberal Reason and Its Forms
The Dynamics of General Equilibrium
Rational Choice Requiem
Toward Economic Sociology/Socio-Economics? Sociological Components in Contemporary Economics and Implications for Sociology
Manifold exploitations
Knowledge and Incentives
Culture and the Labor Market
Beyond Contested Exchange
Homo Economicus at School
Capitalist story‐telling and hegemonic crises
The co-operative game theory of the firm
Evolution and the Theory of Games
What Do Bosses Do?
A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and Individual Development
Stone Age Economics
The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production
Hearts and Minds
An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales
Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes
Unemployment, Long-Term Employment Relations, and Productivity Growth
The Worker Discipline Effect
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Market Socialism
Spontaneous Order
The Firm As a Nexus of Treaties
Elements of Pure Economics
Contested Exchange
| Unique citing works | 123 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,62 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2025 (34) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 106 |