Assurance and US extended deterrence in Nato
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4034686 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David S Yost (Naval Postgraduate School, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 755-780 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-5850 • E-ISSN: 1468-2346 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00826.x |
| OpenAlex | W2070287310 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US ‘extended deterrence’— that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a ‘nuclear guarantee’. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of ‘assurance’ used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements
Computer security · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Economics · Law and economics · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Summit · Computer Science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
US Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Order
Options for Strengthening ROK Nuclear Assurance
Do Foreign Military Deployments Provide Assurance? Unpacking the Micro-Mechanisms of Burden Sharing in Alliances
Nato enlargement and the failure of the cooperative security mindset
Why reassuring allies is harder than deterring adversaries in extended deterrence
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia
The fuzzy limits of self-reliance
Beyond the ‘RtoP’
Varieties of Assurance
Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in Nato
Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,79 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |