The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions

Bibliographic Data

ID4035840
AuthorsRay Takeyh (Council on Foreign Relations), Suzanne Maloney (0000-0001-7302-6701, Brookings Institution)
Year2011
Volume87
Issue6
Pages1297-1312
Publication date2011-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-5850 • E-ISSN: 1468-2346
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01037.x
OpenAlexW2100166425
LanguageEN
Citations received10

Economic sanctions have often been considered an important tool for disciplining adversaries and compelling them to offer important concessions. History, however, suggests otherwise. Economic penalties rarely cause states to abandon important national assets. After decades of struggling under punitive financial measures, Iran has persisted with its objectionable policies ranging from terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All this suggests that ideological regimes that put a premium on their political priorities and which are seemingly insensitive to the mounting costs of their belligerence may not be suitable candidates for the type of cost-benefit analysis that sanctions diplomacy invites

Business · Development economics · Diplomacy · Economic policy · Economic sanctions · Economics · Ideology · Law and economics · Limiting · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Punitive damages · Sanctions · Terrorism · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Engineering · Law

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