The Epistemic Aims of Democracy

Bibliographic Data

ID4079036
AuthorsRobert Weston Siscoe (0000-0002-7804-9651, University of Notre Dame, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume18
Issue11
Publication date2023-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12941
OpenAlexW4386021473
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited106

Many political philosophers have held that democracy has epistemic benefits. Most commonly, this case is made by arguing that democracies are better able to track the truth than other political arrangements. Truth, however, is not the only epistemic good that is politically valuable. A number of other epistemic goods - goods including evidence, intellectual virtue, epistemic justice, and empathetic understanding - can also have political value, and in ways that go beyond the value of truth. In this paper, I will survey those who have argued that democracy can be valuable because of these other epistemic benefits, considering (1) the ways in which these epistemic goods can be of political value and (2) the challenges that democracies face in producing them

Democracy · Economic Justice · Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access