Causal Models and Metaphysics-Part 2

Interpreting Causal Models

Bibliographic Data

ID4079145
AuthorsJennifer Mcdonald (0000-0001-9830-9716, Columbia University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume19
Issue7
Publication date2024-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.13007
OpenAlexW4400100298
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited71

This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally

Causal model · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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