Contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079151 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Yafeng Shan (0000-0001-7736-1822, Tel Aviv University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2019 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Fascículo | 8 |
| Data de publicação | 2019-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12613 |
| OpenAlex | W2964834526 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 13 |
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non-contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue
Compatibilism · Epistemology · Free will · Scientific theory · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,17 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |