Newton's Empiricism and Metaphysics

Newton’s Empiricism and Metaphysics

Bibliographic Data

ID4079164
AuthorsMary Domski (0000-0003-3226-5970, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume5
Issue7
Pages525-534
Publication date2010-06-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00307.x
OpenAlexW1916860712
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited10

Commentators attempting to understand the empirical method that Isaac Newton applies in his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) are forced to grapple with the thorny issue of how to reconcile Newton’s rejection of hypotheses with his appeal to absolute space. On the one hand, Newton claims that his experimental philosophy does not rely on claims that are assumed without empirical evidence, and on the other hand, Newton appeals to an absolute space that, by his own characterization, does not make any impressions on our senses. has offered an insightful strategy for reconciling this apparent contradiction and suggested a way to enhance our understanding of Newton’s ‘empiricism’ such that absolute space can be preserved as a legitimate part of Newton’s experimental project. Recently, has posed a worthy challenge to Stein’s empirical reading of Newton and directed our attention to the metaphysical commitments that underlie the experimental philosophy of Newton’s Principia . Although Stein and Janiak disagree on the degree to which Newton’s empiricism influences his natural philosophy, both agree and clearly show that an adequate treatment of Newton’s empiricism cannot be divorced from consideration of Newton’s views on God and God’s relationship to nature

Empiricism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · History and Theory of Mathematics · Philosophy · Relativity and Gravitational Theory

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