Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079294
AutoresJan Sprenger (0000-0003-0083-9685, Tilburg University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen6
Número7
Páginas497-508
Fecha de publicación2011-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00409.x
OpenAlexW2171434515
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas24

Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a sound and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of H-D confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the H-D method is also highly relevant for scientific practice

Epistemology · Political science · Reasonable Doubt · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology