Nousin Aristotle'sDe Anima

Bibliographic Data

ID4079311
AuthorsCaleb M Cohoe (0000-0002-8063-2950, Metropolitan State University of Denver, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume9
Issue9
Pages594-604
Publication date2014-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12156
OpenAlexW1930305650
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited25

I lay out and examine two sharply conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's claims aboutnousin theDe Anima(DA). On the human separability approach, Aristotle is taken to have identified reasons for thinking that the intellect can, in some way, exist on its own. On the naturalist approach, the soul, including intellectual soul, is inseparable from the body of which it is the form. I discuss how proponents of each approach deal with the key texts from theDA, focusing on four of the most important and interesting topics in this area. Two of these topics concern the activity of understanding (noêsis): first, what does Aristotle mean when he claims that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ and, secondly, what role does Aristotle thinkphantasmata("images" or "representations") play in understanding something? Two of the topics concernDA3.5, one of the most difficult passages in Aristotle's corpus: first, what is the nature and role of the productive intellect (nous poiêtikos) introduced there and, secondly, what are this chapter's implications for the question of whether the intellect or intellectual soul can exist apart from the body? I conclude by identifying areas where further research is necessary

Epistemology · Intellect · Naturalism · Soul · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Philosophy

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