Malebranche and Occasional Causes

Bibliographic Data

ID4079339
AuthorsDavid Cunning (0000-0002-4691-9851, University of Iowa, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume3
Issue3
Pages471-490
Publication date2008-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00132.x
OpenAlexW2102071442
LanguageEN
References cited23

In VI.ii.3 of The Search After Truth Malebranche offers an argument for the view that only God is a cause. Here I defend an interpretation of the argument according to which Malebranche is supposing (quite rightly) that if there is a necessary connection between a cause and its effect, then if creatures were real causes, God's volitions would not be sufficient to bring about their intended effects. I then consider the argument from constant creation that Malebranche offers in Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. If Malebranche holds that God is literally creating things in their entirety at each and every moment, it is difficult to understand how his system could make room for finite substances, and it is difficult to understand how he can allow that finite minds are to be held accountable for what they do. Here I defend a weakened version of the doctrine of constant creation according to which God is constantly creating the modifications of things but is not constantly creating things in their entirety

Creatures · Doctrine · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Theology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Philosophy and Science · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · History · Mathematics · Philosophy

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