Husserl and Rickert on the Nature of Judgment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079346 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrea Staiti (0000-0002-1235-7109, Boston College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 12 |
| Pages | 815-827 |
| Publication date | 2015-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12270 |
| OpenAlex | W2291982275 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 10 |
In this paper I present and assess a controversy between Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert on the nature of judgment, in order to bring to light the originality of Husserl's proposal concerning this important issue. In the first section I provide some context for Rickert's theory of judgment by sketching a reconstruction of nineteenth century logical theory and then proceed to introduce Rickert's view. I suggest that nineteenth century logic is characterized by a criticism of the traditional view that sees categorial judgment (S is P) as the essential form of judgment and the uniting and separating of ideas as sufficient for the constitution of a judgment. Hume inaugurates this criticism, but it finds its most mature expression in the work of Lotze, Brentano, and Rickert. Rickert, in particular, sees simple affirmation and negation of the transcendent value of truth as the essence of judgment. In the second section I present Husserl's criticism of Rickert. Husserl's criticism revolves around the distinction between simple judgments and the higher-order affirmative or negative stance we can adopt with respect to previously articulated simple judgments. Simple judgments register the mereological relation holding among something and one of its properties, and they do not entail an affirmative or negative stance. Their function is to constitute states of affairs drawing on concrete perceptual situations. Higher-order affirmation or negation occurs when we set out to revisit a foregoing simple judgment in order to confirm or disconfirm the veridicality of its proposed state of affairs. In the third part I suggest a diagnosis of the origin of the mistake in earlier theories. Simple judgments are easy to conflate with non-simple, higher-order judgmental stances because (1) they have the same logical value and (2) they cannot be seen without the aid of genuinely phenomenological (as opposed to retrospective) reflection. In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl's analysis amounts to a vindication of categorial judgment in its traditional form 'S is P', which continues to maintain a phenomenological legitimacy even in the wake of Frege's canonical dismissal of subject and predicate
Constitution · Criticism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Negation · Political science · History · Law · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |