Linguistic Intuitions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079463
AutoresJeffrey Maynes (0000-0003-3800-1992), Steven Gro (0000-0002-9224-8200, Johns Hopkins University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2013
Volumen8
Número8
Páginas714-730
Fecha de publicación2013-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12052
OpenAlexW2331044492
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas68

Linguists often advert to what are sometimes calledlinguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: Whatarelinguistic intuitions - for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture - for example, as a case study of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted - for example, might some subjects' intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers'ownappeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a 'mentalist' conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein

Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Philosophy of science · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation