More of a Cause

Recent Work on Degrees of Causation and Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID4079528
AuthorsAlex Kaiserman (0000-0002-7209-5980, University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume13
Issue7
Publication date2018-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12498
OpenAlexW2789900056
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited37

It is often natural to compare two events by describing one as 'more of a cause' of some effect than the other. But what do such comparisons amount to, exactly? This paper aims to provide a guided tour of the recent literature on 'degrees of causation'. Section2looks at what I call 'dependence measures', which arise from thinking of causes asdifference-makers. Section3looks at what I call 'production measures', which arise from thinking of causes asjointly sufficientfor their effects. Finally, section4examines the important question of whether there is any sense in which an agent ismoreresponsible for an outcome in virtue of her action being more of a cause of it. I describe a puzzle that emerges from this question, and explore various strategies for resolving it

Causation · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Physics · Positive economics · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment