Understanding as Knowledge of Meaning

Bibliographic Data

ID4079612
AuthorsAlex Barber (0000-0003-1108-1072, The Open University, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume8
Issue10
Pages964-977
Publication date2013-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12075
OpenAlexW1947999963
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited33

Testimony, the transmission of knowledge through communication, requires a shared understanding of linguistic expressions and utterances of them. Is this understanding itself a kind of knowledge, knowledge of meaning? The intuitive answer is 'yes', but the nature of such knowledge is controversial, as is the assumption that understanding is a kind of knowledge at all. This article is a critical examination of recent work on the nature and role of semantic knowledge in the generation of the linguistic understanding needed for testimony. After describing a default view - that linguistic understanding partially consists in the possession and application of knowledge of a compositional theory of truth conditions - it scrutinizes two recent charges against this view: that linguistic understanding and knowledge of meaning are conceptually distinct, and that semantic 'knowledge' is knowledge without an object

Body of knowledge · Cognition · Cognitive science · Descriptive knowledge · Epistemology · Linguistics · Procedural knowledge · Semantic memory · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation

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