Spinoza on Physical Science
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079640 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amy Peterman (0000-0002-9619-9282, University of Rochester, corresponding author), Alison Peterman |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 214-223 |
| Publication date | 2014-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12115 |
| OpenAlex | W1606561089 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
In this paper, I discuss Spinoza on the proper methods and content of physical science. I start by showing how Spinoza's epistemology leads him to a kind of pessimism about the prospects of empirical and mathematical methods in natural philosophy. While they are useful for life, they do not tell us about nature, as Spinoza puts it, "as it is in itself." At the same time, Spinoza seems to allow that we have some knowledge of physical things and their behavior. So I go on to outline and critique a few of the accounts of how Spinoza thinks we can do this, focusing on the role of the common notions in physics. In the third section, I discuss the possible contents of physics, for Spinoza, and argue that they are not, as is usually thought, fundamentally Cartesian. I conclude by pointing to some promising directions for future research and suggesting a few heuristics for such research
Epistemology · Heuristics · Pessimism · Philosophy of science · Physical science · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Political Theology and Sovereignty · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |