Moral Contingentism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079650 |
|---|---|
| Authors | N D Cannon (0000-0003-1340-5691, Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Publication date | 2025-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.70036 |
| OpenAlex | W4410051904 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 79 |
This paper surveys a number of views that fall under the name moral contingentism, the position in metaethics that claims that the fundamental ethical facts are metaphysically contingent. In other words, the fundamental ethical facts are true in some worlds, but not all. I look at three kinds of contingentism: law-based contingentism, particularist contingentism, and nonseparationism. In each case, I outline the relevant view, give reasons we might find it attractive, and then discuss aspects of the view that need closer attention. The upshot of this paper is that contingentism is a live and interesting position in metaethics and has the potential to impact debates across the field
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Ethical Realism
Real Definition
Guide to ground
Metaphysical Dependence
What Would Normative Necessity Be?
The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Reality and its Structure
Modality
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism
Moral Principles as Generics
Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism
(Im)moral theorizing
Why bother with so what
On The Logical And Moral Adequacy Of Particularism
Slaves of the Passions
On Moral Objections to Moral Realism
Standing up for supervenience
Interpreting Quantum Entanglement
A dilemma for non-naturalists
Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism
Thanks, We’re good
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13
Principled Ethics
Ethics Without Principles
A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12
The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge
Immoral realism
No foundations for metaphysical coherentism
Reality and Its Structure
Supervenience in Metaphysics
Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism
Ground
Ontological Dependence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |