Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self-Knowledge, and Probable Opinion

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079693
AutoresDeborah Boyle (0000-0003-2975-2268, College of Charleston, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen10
Número7
Páginas438-450
Fecha de publicación2015-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12232
OpenAlexW1597326065
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13
Referencias citadas15

Scholarly interest in Margaret Cavendish's philosophical views has steadily increased over the past decade, but her epistemology has received little attention, and no consensus has emerged; Cavendish has been characterized as a skeptic, as a rationalist, as presenting an alternative epistemology to both rationalism and empiricism, and even as presenting no clear theory of knowledge at all. This paper concludes that Cavendish was only a modest skeptic, for she believed that humans can achieve knowledge through sensitive and rational perception as well as through self-knowledge and can form probable opinions through reasoning

Empiricism · Epistemology · Perception · Rationalism · Skepticism · Historical Philosophy and Science · History and Developments in Astronomy · Medical History and Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology