Legal and Moral Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID4079705
AuthorsAntony Duff (University of Stirling, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume4
Issue6
Pages978-986
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00257.x
OpenAlexW2142468793
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited14

The paper begins with the plausible view that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, and explains its plausibility. A necessary distinction is then drawn between liability and answerability as two dimensions of responsibility, and is shown to underpin the distinction in criminal law between offences and defences. This enables us to distinguish strict liability from strict answerability, and to see that whilst strict criminal liability seems inconsistent with the principle that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, strict criminal answerability is not. We must ask, therefore, whether, when and why strict criminal responsibility is unacceptable

Criminal law · Criminal liability · Criminal responsibility · Law and economics · Liability · Moral responsibility · Political science · Sociology · Strict liability · Free Will and Agency · Law · Psychology · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification

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