Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

Bibliographic Data

ID4079708
AuthorsAaron Smuts (Rhode Island College, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume9
Issue8
Pages518-526
Publication date2014-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12160
OpenAlexW3190106768
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited29

Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view and the reasons view. Along the way, I discuss the significance of falling in love, the problem of trading up, and the notion of irreplaceability. I evaluate attempts to justify love based on the intrinsic and the relational properties of the beloved

Epistemology · Normative · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification