Sensory Experience and Intentionalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079744 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Pierre Le Morvan (0000-0002-9746-1043, College of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 685-702 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00148.x |
| OpenAlex | W2003669955 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 36 |
Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing
Adverbial · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Some main problems of philosophy
Consciousness, Color, and Content
Reference and Consciousness
Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?
The Obscure Object of Hallucination
On Being Alienated
Perception, Knowledge and Belief
Ten Problems of Consciousness
Consciousness and Experience
Objects of Consciousness
The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience
Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”
Intentionalism Defended
Sellars and the “Myth of the Given”
Externalist Theories of Perception
Perception and Representation
Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content
Intentionality
Vision and Experience
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |