Measurement-Theoretic Accounts of Propositional Attitudes

Bibliographic Data

ID4079817
AuthorsRobert J Matthews (0000-0002-2813-7952, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume6
Issue11
Pages828-841
Publication date2011-11-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00438.x
OpenAlexW1502773689
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited19

In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates (such as believes that it's sunny outside) are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes (such as mass, length, and temperature). Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I sketch the general outlines of measurement-theoretic accounts of propositional attitudes, explaining in the briefest terms the basic idea of such accounts, why some have thought such accounts plausible, how these accounts might go, what their implications might be both for our conception of propositional attitudes and for their role in cognitive scientific theorizing, and where the potential problems with such accounts might lie

Algorithm · Epistemology · Linguistics · Propositional calculus · Propositional variable · Sketch · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Artificial Intelligence

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