Motivated reasoning and the ethics of belief

Bibliographic Data

ID4079856
AuthorsJonathan Ellis (0000-0002-1101-3128, University of California, Santa Cruz, corresponding author), Jon Ellis (0000-0002-0798-1134)
Year2022
Volume17
Issue6
Publication date2022-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12828
OpenAlexW4224061896
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited49

In recent years,motivated reasoninghas received significant attention across numerous areas of philosophy, including political philosophy, social philosophy, epistemology, moral psychology, philosophy of science, even metaphysics. At the heart of much of this interest is the idea that motivated reasoning (e.g., rationalization, wishful thinking, and self-deception) isproblematic, that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity, or is otherwise irrational. Is motivated reasoning epistemically problematic? Is it always? When it is, what is the nature of the violation? Philosophical projects on motivated reasoning require informed positions on these questions, demanding explicit engagement with fundamental issues about epistemic normativity and the ethics of belief. But attention to this has been limited, thwarting progress on a variety of critical questions. In this paper, I distinguish some of the key issues at play and discuss their interactions. At the end, I offer three methodological recommendations for future research on motivated reasoning

Analytic reasoning · Deception · Deductive reasoning · Epistemology · Irrational number · Metaphysics · Philosophy of science · Rationality · Wishful thinking · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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Open DOIOpen Access