Perception and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus

Bibliographic Data

ID4079869
AuthorsNaly Thaler (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume11
Issue3
Pages160-167
Publication date2016-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12310
OpenAlexW2295296750
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

In this paper, I examine several key issues relating to the definition of knowledge as perception in the first part of Plato's Theaetetus. I begin by explaining the workings of the 'secret doctrine' of perception, which is introduced in order to support the idea that perception is incorrigible (and hence worthy to the title of knowledge), and then turn to examine the two refutations of the definition of knowledge as perception which appear at the end of the first part of the Theaetetus. I shall present and explain distinct lines of interpretation pertaining to these passages and explore the consequences they attempt to draw regarding Plato's views on the perceptual world, the nature of perception and how these bear on his conception of knowledge

Doctrine · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Theology · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Philosophy · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub