Moral worth

Bibliographic Data

ID4079871
AuthorsEuan K Metz (0009-0001-4759-8842, American University in Cairo, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume19
Issue4
Publication date2024-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12982
OpenAlexW4399123066
LanguageEN
References cited38

The concept of moral worth, of being creditworthy for doing the right thing, is often seen as essential feature of a moral theory. It forces us to provide a clear account of the relationship between moral motivation and moral action, raising important questions about the demands that morality makes of us. Work on moral worth has a long lineage, especially in Kantian scholarship. Recent years, however, have seen a more focused interest in the nature of moral worth outside of the Kantian tradition. Indeed, part of this interest stems from a rejection of an orthodox Kantian understanding of what moral worth is. In this article, I chart prominent reasons for rejecting the orthodoxy, and distinguish between two rival camps that have emerged: Right Reasons Accounts and Rightness Accounts. I delineate some of the demands that these accounts must meet, and end by discussing a potential way forward that has emerged via hybrid views and goal-based views that attempt to utilise the most promising features of each

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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