An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Melinda A Roberts (0000-0001-6067-9287, College of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 765-776 |
| Publication date | 2011-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00435.x |
| OpenAlex | W1598467272 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 18 |
According to the Asymmetry, it is wrong to bring a miserable child into existence but permissible not to bring a happy child into existence. When it comes to procreation, we don't have complete procreative liberty. But we do have some discretion. The Asymmetry seems highly intuitive. But a plausible account of the Asymmetry has been surprisingly difficult to provide, and it may well be that most moral philosophers - or at least most consequentialists - think that all reasonable efforts to provide such an account have by now been exhausted. In this paper, I argue that, despite the difficulties, the Asymmetry is too important to be set aside. I also note a handful of accounts of the Asymmetry that have been proposed and why they fail. It seems, for example, that it will not do to say that some people matter morally and others don't, or that a person matters morally in some worlds but not others. My own conclusion is that, while we are bound to say all people matter morally - you, me and the merely possible - we are not bound to say that all their losses- or all ours- matter morally. We can instead distinguish between morally significant and insignificant losses, with the distinction between the two being a matter of where the loss is incurred in relation to the person who incurs it. This way of looking at things - which I call Variabilism- provides the basis for a plausible account of the Asymmetry. The availability of such an account suggests, I think, that our prospects for rescuing the Asymmetry are bright
Aside · Asymmetry · Discretion · Epistemology · Law and economics · Physics · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry
The Person-Based Intuition and the Better Chance Puzzle
Population Ethics, the Mere Addition Paradox, and the Structure of Consequentialism
Moral demands and the far future
Transfinitely Transitive Value
A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views
The Philosophical Core of Effective Altruism
The Procreation Asymmetry Destabilized
Applying Pascal’s Wager to Procreation
The procreation asymmetry asymmetry
The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem
A few concerns about bioethics
History and Persons
Deontology and safe artificial intelligence
The Ethics of Procreation and Adoption
Harming Future Persons
Genethics
Problems of Population Theory Obligations to Future Generations . R. I. Sikora , Brian Barry
Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives
Weighing Lives
The Asymmetry of Creating and Not Creating Life
Should We Value Population
The Non-identity Fallacy
Obligations to Future Generations
Reply to Vallentyne
Can We Harm and Benefit In Creating
Being and Betterness
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |