Scientific progress

Four accounts

Bibliographic Data

ID4079958
AuthorsFinnur Dellsén (0000-0003-4989-4204, University of Inland Norway, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume13
Issue11
Publication date2018-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12525
OpenAlexW2810264047
LanguageEN
Citations received20
References cited30

Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories "get closer to the truth," i.e., increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories' effectiveness for solving scientific problems. A third answer is that progress occurs when the stock of scientific knowledge accumulates. A fourth and final answer is that scientific progress consists in increasing scientific understanding,i.e., the capacity to correctly explain and reliably predict relevant phenomena. This paper compares and contrasts these four accounts of scientific progress, considers some of the most prominent arguments for and against each account, and briefly explores connections to different forms of scientific realism

Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Scientific evidence · Scientific literature · Scientific modelling · Scientific progress · Scientific realism · Scientific reasoning · Scientific theory · Sociology of scientific knowledge · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies

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