What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079966 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hannes Leitgeb (0000-0002-8276-149X, University of Bristol, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 276-290 |
| Publication date | 2007-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.x |
| OpenAlex | W2050608833 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 31 |
This article outlines what a formal theory of truthshouldbe like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages
Epistemology · Semantic theory of truth · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Cognitive Projects and the Trustworthiness of Positive Truth
Hyperintensionality for Logics
Semidisquotation and the infinitary function of truth
Paradox as a Guide to Ground
Sets, lies, and analogy
Logics of Truth and Maximality
The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind
Is the Hype about strength warranted
Conceptual engineering for truth
Sets and supersets
Expressing logical disagreement from within
Gaps, gluts, and theoretical equivalence
Deflationary truth and the ontology of expressions
Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
On the Logicality of Truth
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |