Epistemic Luck

Bibliographic Data

ID4079982
AuthorsJoshue Orozco (Whitworth University, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume6
Issue1
Pages11-21
Publication date2011-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00365.x
OpenAlexW2316565996
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited42

Epistemologists often remark that knowledge precludes luck. A true belief based on a guess or hunch is not knowledge because it seems merely fortuitous, too much of an accident, and, well, lucky that one happened to get things right. Of course, true beliefs based on guesses and hunches are not justified. However, Gettier cases have persuasively shown that even justified true beliefs can admit knowledge-precluding kinds of luck. So in what sense are justified true beliefs that don't amount knowledge lucky or 'true only by chance'? I will address three different approaches to epistemic luck that have received significant attention in the recent literature: reliability approaches to epistemic luck, credit approaches to epistemic luck, and responsibilist or control approaches to epistemic luck. I will then turn my attention to the implications that epistemic luck has for other epistemic states. I will focus particularly on state of understanding and examine whether, and to what extent, understanding is vulnerable to epistemic luck

Epistemology · Luck · Philosophy of science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Psychological and Educational Research Studies · Psychology

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