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Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence

Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments

Bibliographic Data

ID4079983
AuthorsJoshua Rollins (University of Oklahoma, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume10
Issue1
Pages78-90
Publication date2015-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12184
OpenAlexW1889050581
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited17

Until recently, epistemology was largely caught in the grips of an epistemically unrealisticradical epistemological individualismon which the beliefs and testimony of others were of virtually no epistemic significance. Thankfully, epistemologists have bucked the individualist trend, acknowledging that one person's belief or testimony thatPmight offer another person prima facie epistemic reasons - orsocial evidenceas I call it - to believeP. In this paper, I discuss the possibility and conditions under which beliefs and testimony act as social evidence, in particular, beliefs and testimony regarding the existence of God. Theepistemic egoistmaintains that one must possess positive reasons in favor of other people's reliability or trustworthiness before their beliefs and testimony offer prima facie social evidence. Theepistemic universalist, on the other hand, argues that the beliefs of all others are prima facie credible and should be treated accordingly. All this will set up subsequent discussion of the epistemic significance of common consent or widespread belief in God. I show how common consent arguments assume the epistemic universalist's account of the conditions under which the beliefs and testimony of others acquire reason-giving force as social evidence

Epistemology · Ethical egoism · Individualism · Objectivism · Political science · Prima facie · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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  • An Essay concerning Human Understanding

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Unique citing works1
Citations per year0,2
Citation span2021 - 2021 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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