Varieties of Expressivism

Bibliographic Data

ID4080000
AuthorsDorit Bar‐on (0000-0003-4199-3267, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author), James Sias (Dickinson College)
Year2013
Volume8
Issue8
Pages699-713
Publication date2013-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12051
OpenAlexW1492253251
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited38

After offering a characterization of what unites versions of 'expressivism', we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism - a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis - and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for preserving what is essential to their view. These resources comprise a re-configuring of expressivism, the result of which is the view we call 'neo-expressivism'. After illustrating how the neo-expressivist model works in the case of avowals and ethical claims, we explain how it avoids the problems of traditional expressivism

Epistemology · Expressivism · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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