Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4080042 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Heinrich Sauer (0000-0001-8039-0376, Leiden University, autor correspondente), Hanno Sauer |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Fascículo | 10 |
| Páginas | 708-721 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00437.x |
| OpenAlex | W1924431729 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 43 |
Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the 'effectiveness'-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral judgment, and that typically, moral reasoning is a matter of mere confabulation. In this survey, the empirical challenge to this thesis made by the 'social intuitionist' model of moral judgment and reasoning is discussed. The model claims that moral reasoning is essentially ineffective and, psychologically speaking, a matter of mere post hoc-rationalizations of cognitively impenetratable gut reactions. Several interpretations of this evidence are discussed and it is shown that there is room for a psychology of moral reasoning that can account for the available empirical evidence and yet does not have to give up the most central elements of a normative picture of moral reasoning
Cognitive psychology · Empirical psychology · Epistemology · Intuitionism · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Normative · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social intuitionism · Theoretical psychology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Sentimental Rules
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
The emotional basis of moral judgments
Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Moral Heuristics
Pushing moral buttons
In two minds
Universal moral grammar
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment
The emotional dog and its rational tail
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Telling more than we can know
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Experimental philosophy
The Sources of Normativity
The development of social knowledge
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Changing one's prejudiced ways
"Unlearning" automatic biases
Implementation intentions
In a different voice
Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being
Strategic automation of emotion regulation
Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe
Mental contamination and mental correction
What Experimental Evidence Shows Us about the Role of Emotions in Moral Judgement
Morality and Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,22 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2024 (8) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |