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Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4080042
AutoresHeinrich Sauer (0000-0001-8039-0376, Leiden University, autor correspondente), Hanno Sauer
Ano2011
Volume6
Fascículo10
Páginas708-721
Data de publicação2011-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00437.x
OpenAlexW1924431729
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas43

Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the 'effectiveness'-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral judgment, and that typically, moral reasoning is a matter of mere confabulation. In this survey, the empirical challenge to this thesis made by the 'social intuitionist' model of moral judgment and reasoning is discussed. The model claims that moral reasoning is essentially ineffective and, psychologically speaking, a matter of mere post hoc-rationalizations of cognitively impenetratable gut reactions. Several interpretations of this evidence are discussed and it is shown that there is room for a psychology of moral reasoning that can account for the available empirical evidence and yet does not have to give up the most central elements of a normative picture of moral reasoning

Cognitive psychology · Empirical psychology · Epistemology · Intuitionism · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Normative · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social intuitionism · Theoretical psychology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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Obras citantes distintas2
Citações por ano0,22
Intervalo de citações2017 - 2024 (8)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 2
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