Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon
An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4087262 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dipak K Gupta (San Diego State University, corresponding author), Kusum Mundra (0000-0003-2731-1493, San Diego State University) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 573-598 |
| Publication date | 2005-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Terrorism and Political Violence (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0954-6553 • E-ISSN: 1556-1836 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09546550500189895 |
| OpenAlex | W2118168204 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 3 |
Using twice-yearly data from 1991 to 2003, we analyze the incidents of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad within Israel and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Given the exploratory nature of the question, we have first estimated the relevant coefficients by using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Ratio and then checked their robustness by reestimating the model with the help of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as an interrelated system. The results indicate that the two groups deliberately use suicide bombings as strategic weapons within the larger Israeli-Palestinian political milieu. With the Western world locked in an armed struggle with the militant extremists of Islam based on millenarian ideologies, this study emphasizes the need to develop appropriate analytical capabilities to distinguish among terrorist groups and their motivations, ideologies, and tactics. At times, Palestinian politics are dizzyingly incoherent,...at times bloody, at other times perfectly clear.—Edward W. Said Acknowledgments The research for this study was partially funded by the United States Institute of Peace. The authors are grateful to a number of colleagues and friends. However, our intellectual debt runs particularly deep to Professor Ariel Merari for sharing his data as well as his comments on the earlier version of this paper. We are also grateful to David Rapoport, Mia Bloom, Farid Abdel-Nour, and Ronald King. Notes At times, Palestinian politics are dizzyingly incoherent,...at times bloody, at other times perfectly clear.—Edward W. Said * denotes significance at 5% level. T = 26 ** denotes significance at 10% level *** denotes significance at 1% level. For Islamic Jihad the results are reported with no correction for overdispersion. Note: The standard errors are in parentheses * denotes significance at 5% level ** denotes significance at 10% level *** denotes significance at 1% level The variable PLOshoot is used as a control variable for the system 1. Walter Laqueur A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2001). 2. Richard Cohen, "Palestinian Suicide Signal Desperation, Irrationality," Washington Post, February 6, p. A14, 2002. 3. Scott Atran, (2003) "Who Wants to Be a Martyr?" New York Times, May 5, 2003. 4. Dagmer Hellman-Rajanayangam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1994); Narayan Swamy, Rajat Ganguli, and Ian McDuff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); Narayan Swami, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2002). 5. For an excellent survey of current literature on the psychology of terrorism, see Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42. 6. Lamis Andoni, "Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers," Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 4 (1997): 33–45; Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign Policy 79, no. 1, 66–75; (2000): Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1, (2003): 171–184. 7. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 8. On this also see Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair and the Need for Hope., An Interview with Eyad el Sarraj." Journal of Palestine Studies, 31 no. 4 (2002): 71–76. 9. Reuven Konet, "Sexual Fantasies of a Suicide Bomber," http://www.israelinsider.com. Accessed 16 August, 2001. 10. Robin Morgan, "The Demon Lover Syndrome," Ms, 2002, 17. Also see Lina Sagaral Reyes, "Disempowered Palestinian Girls' Uncommon Death Wishes—Research Sheds Light." Women in Action. http://www.isiswomen.org/pub/wia/wia3-04/lina1.htm. 11. For an extensive discussion of repressed sexuality of the suicide bombers and Islamic imageries see Yotam Feldner, "72 Black-Eyed Virgins," MEMRI (The Middle Eastern Research Institute), October 30, 2001. 12. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism? The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers," New Republic, June 24, 2002, 27–33. 13. Hilal Khashan, "Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings," Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (2003): 1049–67. 14. See, for example, Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Also see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 15. Edwin S. Shneidman, Definition of Suicide (New York: Wiley, 1985). Also see Edwin S. Shneidman, "Petrubation and Lethality," in ed. D. G. Jacobs, The Harvard Medical School Guide to Suicide Assessment and Intervention, (San Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1999), p. 83–97. 16. For one of the most comprehensive studies on individual motivations for taking part in suicide bombings, see Ariel Merari, "Social Organizations and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of Terrorism: Proceedings from an International Expert Meeting in Oslo, 9–11 June, 2003, ed. Tore Borgo, 81–98 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003). Also see Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," The New Yorker, November 19, 2001. 17. Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 343–61. 18. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization 56, no. 2, (2002): 263–96. 19. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Commitment, and Counter-Terrorism: A Formal Model" (paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association under the title "An Adverse Selection Model of Terrorism," Washington, DC, September 2003). 20. Rui De Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political Extremism and Political Violence," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1998). 21. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Also see Mia Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding," Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1, (2004): 61–88. Mia Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka," Civil Wars, 6, no. 2, (2003): 54–84. 22. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregressive-Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 829–44; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What Do We Know about the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?" in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke, 119–37 (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Walter Enders, Applied Econometric Time Series (New York: Wiley, 1995); Will Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 3 (1998): 851–73; Dipak K. Gupta, Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague, "Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 2 (1993): 301–39. 23. Suicide attacks for collective causes have been known since antiquity—see Walter Laqueur, "Terror's New Face," Harvard International Review 20 (1999): 48–51. He points out that "suicide missions have been carried out for as long as wars have been fought." For instance, the kamikaze attacks by Japanese pilots during World War II (see Albert Axel and Hideaki Kase, Kamikaze: Japan's Suicide Gods, (Harlow: Longman, 2002); Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002)) are very well documented. However, few groups until recently have used suicide attacks as part of a sustained campaign. 24. We should note here that although the first suicide attack within Israel was carried out by Hamas on April 16, 1993, near Mekhola in the Jordan valley, we start our data from 1991. This is because we wanted to capture the full impacts of the independent variables, including the lagged ones. 25. Yasir Arafat, "A Discussion with Yasir Arafat," Journal of Palestine Studies 11, no. 2 (1982): 3–15; Issa Al-Shuaibi, "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II," Journal of Palestine Studies 9, no. 2 (1980): 50–70; Mamdouth Nofal et al., "Refelections on Al-Nakba," Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 1 (1998): 5–35; Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma'oz, eds., The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution 1964–1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). 26. See for example Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence (New York: Praeger, 1991). 27. It is important to note here that in this article we are using the term PLO, although after 1994 the organization transformed itself into the Palestinian National Authority with commonly used acronym PA. 28. Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Times Books, 1970), 160. 29. Michael C. Hudson, "Developments and Setbacks in Palestinian Resistance Movements, 1967–71," Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 3 (1972): 64–84. 30. Although the DFLP was, like the PFLP, a pro-Soviet socialist group, it broke with the latter over its agenda of creating a class struggle among the poor and working-class Palestinians. 31. Before this date, Hamas was more of a charitable organization serving poor Palestinians primarily in the Gaza Strip. 32. Article 1 of its charter proclaims, "The basis of the Islamic Resistance Movement is Islam. From Islam it derives its ideas and its fundamental precepts and views of life, the universe, and humanity; and it judges all its actions according to Islam and is inspired by Islam to correct its errors." (Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p.177). And it adds the Islamic Brotherhood motto in Article 5, "Allah is its [Hamas's] goal, the Prophet is its model, and the Qur'an is its constitution" (178). 33. Article 11 states: "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf [endowed] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection. It is not right to give it up or any part of it. Neither a single Arab state nor all Arab states, neither a king nor a president, not all the kings and presidents, nor any organization or all of them—be they Palestinian or Arab—have such authority, because the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf [endowed] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection." (Ibid., 181). 34. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of Hamas, the Israeli authorities directly and indirectly encouraged its inception as a counterbalance to the PLO (Mishal and Sela, 36). There had been a persistent rumor among the supporters of the PLO that Hamas was a creation of Israel to divide and conquer the Palestinian community. In fact, Arafat claimed that "we must remember that these organizations were created by Israel, which also distributes arms to them." Quoted in Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict," chapter 2. 35. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 3. 36. Judith Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 37. Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). 38. Abu-Amr Ziad, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 39. Although the murder of Shiqaqi remains unsolved, there is a strong but unfounded suspicion within the Palestinian community that it was the work of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad. 40. See International Counter–Terrorism (ICT), http://www.ict.org.il/. 41. In terms of the calculation of costs and benefits, the jihadi groups all over the world have found suicide attacks to be the most cost-effective weapon. Thus Ayman al-Zawahiri, the close aide of Osama bin Laden, wrote, "The method of martyrdom operations [is] the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahaidin [organization] in terms of casualties." Quoted in Benjamin and Simon, Sacred Terror, 28–29. Also see Dan Radlauer, "An Engineered Tragedy: Statistical Analysis of Casualties in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Sepetember 2000– September 2002." ICT, http://www.ict.org.il/. 42. By this time, an overwhelming portion of the Palestinians were supportive of the suicide attacks against the Jewish state (see Gal Luft, "The Palestinian H–Bomb." Foreign Affairs. July/August, 2002, p. 2–7). 43. Although the PLO had officially eschewed violence against Israel, the entire time period saw continued armed attacks by PLO-affiliated groups, although they did not stage any suicide attacks before the peace process came to an end (see Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Politics at a Crossroad," Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 4 (1996): 29–39). 44. Any discussion of the Palestinian rebel groups must include the Syrian- and Iranian-backed radical Shiite group Hizbullah (Party of God). Established during the Lebanese political chaos of 1982 with the ideological guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hizbullah quickly established its radical credentials through a series of spectacular acts. However, for our current study, Hizbullah holds limited interest since it has been involved in only one suicide attack within the political boundaries of Israel and the territories controlled by the PA during the study period—and also because of its history and ethnic composition, it follows a different cycle from Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, the central focus of this study. 45. Dipak K. Gupta, Path to Collective Madness: A Study in Social Order and Political Pathology (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). Gupta expands the utility maxim of a "rational" actor and suggests that rational actors maximize their self-utility as well as the utility of the groups in which the actor claims membership. 46. Although the estimated equations with quarterly data show very similar patterns, we decided to use biannual data since, in our judgment, it provided us with a clearer picture. The results of estimation with quarterly data are available from the authors. 47. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1970). For the latest testing of Gurr's hypothesis, see G. D. Saxon, "Repression, Grievances, Mobilization, and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr's Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion," International Interactions 31, no. 3 (2005): 87–116. 48. Dipak K. Gupta, Economics of Political Violence: The Effects of Political Instability on Economic Growth (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990), 157–62. 49. Note that if this negative value of the composite coefficient α*′ is the result of a negative value of the government reaction coefficient β′, then it may signify a mollifying effort by the government or its inability to mount a proper action following a terrorist attack. Neither of these are applicable to Israel. 50. Although it may appear as if suicide attacks are instantaneous in response to Israeli acts of provocation, their strategic use points to much more careful planning, which requires such activities as choosing (and surveillance of) the target, drawing up a detailed plan of action, manufacture of the bomb pack, selection and mental training of the attacker, transportation of the human bomb to its target, etc. Given such a complex process, it is difficult to determine a single time period for retaliation. Therefore we decided to treat it as an empirical question and allow the data to show the average time of retaliation. For a detailed discussion of the organizational steps leading up to a suicide attack, see Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003): 65–92. Also, as circumstantial evidence we may point out that on September 1, 2004, Hamas carried out two consecutive suicide bus attacks in Israel. Nearly six months after the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (March 22, 2004) and four and a half months after Abdel Aziz Rantisi's (April 17, 2004) killing, Hamas claimed the attacks in their names (see Steven Erlanger, "Twin Blasts Kill 16 in Israel: Hamas Claims Responsibility," New York Times, September 1, 2004). 51. Richard N. and The of International University Press, Bloom, Dying to all have that to a for of as they which are to to The reaction then for the authorities to a Palestine and the Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001). incidents include the the of the under the in October 2000, Ariel a to the from to 2003, the end of the and the of Ariel and his We have used the entire period of the as political because more in Israeli is an of Palestinian From his as the in of the at the and in political has been a for Palestinian See Bloom, Dying to chapter 2. include the following in February 1994 an Israeli Palestinians in a the October assassination of the assassination of the assassination of and his and the June 2003 assassination of the Hamas Abdel Aziz Social and (New York: and Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Israeli in June and May an was in May and Ehud was government in February a was only to the The Israeli Ariel and his However, from the for a in 2003. The peace in this variable in September 1993, the of the in May the beginning of Palestinian in September the of the in the of the Palestinian in the of the in October the and in the PLO Israel. See Alan Krueger and David Terrorism," in Terrorism and ed. Dipak K. Gupta, 2005). See Pape, The used in this article be from Dipak It is important to in that the PA and Arafat any in attacks against the Jewish state and its the Israeli government taking any in this we are to these groups as The Test for the show However, since this period a limited number of we are not the See Bloom, Dying to chapter 2. in the value from to 1 is by 1. See A. and K. Regression Analysis of University of Press, 1998). It is well known that the is by its in the is to the which is in A correction for the is that the is to the the of Quasi-Maximum Likelihood for the See M. Econometric Analysis of and Press, 2002). Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the For a detailed discussion of suicide attacks and Israeli see Bloom, Dying to chapter 2. Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Commitment, and New Republic, June Also see Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide "The of the of Israel and (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2004). Also see the A Assessment of National and Foreign University of Press, 2004). On 22, 2004, of the period under in this Israeli Sheikh Ahmed the of Hamas, a Gaza An Hamas that Israel had the of and to of It its after the of Abdel Aziz a the to (see the Post, 5, 2004, Gal the of suicide attacks in the of these two by that these and other such acts had a on the of the terrorist organizations (Ibid., The for the system is by = the of the is = and the is by = In the the errors are to be and that the of the system is by In the there is because The Hamas and Islamic Jihad is It = = for all Hamas and PLOshoot is = and PLOshoot and Islamic Jihad is = It is well known that in the is of 1 and is to be other we out any for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and In the we least at the first stage to and then an of and are until the coefficients and the See "An of Seemingly Unrelated and of Journal of the American Statistical Association R. The of and (New York: Econometric Analysis NJ: 2003). "An Economic Study of Journal of and Economics no. 1 See Enders and Sandler, "What we "The Logic of Terrorism: as a of Strategic in of Terrorism: States of ed. Walter (New York: University Press, This points out that is the standard by which is with other of political Although there is no of an for terrorist which at the number of and it may be that in the under of Robert as its "Palestinian Resistance and Causes and In Proceedings from Causes of An International Expert Meeting in Oslo, 9–11 June, Tore (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003). For a discussion of of suicide bombings from the of the groups, see Benjamin and Simon, Sacred F. "Rational and of as the to with a of independent For a discussion of the Palestinian of suicide as a strategic of see Suicide and in Middle East no. (2002): Palestinian for Policy and Research Also see Gal Luft, "The Palestinian Foreign Affairs, no. 4 (2002): National on the of International Terrorism: of the National on Terrorism 2000). This that political is more the for A similar was by Laqueur, "Terror's New Bloom, Dying to The of a has created a in Israel and For a discussion of the see Linda S. 25, For the of see the entire as against the see "What in for Washington on Middle East Affairs, 2004, G. to a International 30, and the of Political Islam in History (2003): This points out that the Hamas is well of their central in Palestinian particularly in of the of the PA. that an Islamic is to the of the Islamic has may allow its in the peace The Politics of Ethnic Conflict in Conflict and in ed. Books, by using Gupta, Singh, and have that are to by the use of within are by political For a discussion see Dipak K. Gupta, of to the in the Understanding of (paper presented at the Social and Psychological Factors in the of Terrorism at September 2005)
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| Unique citing works | 31 |
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| Citations per year | 1,63 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2025 (19) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
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| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |