Tactical Means, Strategic Ends
Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4087553 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Devin D Jessee (Tufts University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 367-388 |
| Publication date | 2006-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Terrorism and Political Violence (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0954-6553 • E-ISSN: 1556-1836 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09546550600751941 |
| OpenAlex | W2072339925 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 1 |
This analysis surveys Al Qaeda's employment of denial and deception (D&D) and shows that it uses D&D on tactical and operational levels in order to achieve strategic results. It defines denial and deception and explains how they relate to Al Qaeda, overviews Al Qaeda's changing network structure and seeks to summarize how Al Qaeda employs D&D throughout its operations. This paper is structured to show that denial and deception are institutionalized factors that manifest themselves through all aspects of bin Laden's organization and that the traditional conception of D&D—that nonstate actors are incapable of employing deception as an element of grand strategy—is incorrect
Al qaeda · Business · Computer security · Deception · Denial · Law and economics · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
| Citations per year | 0.32 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2007 - 2025 (19) |
| Highly cited | No |