A Paradox in Intentionalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4158084 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel O Nathan (Texas Tech University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 32-48 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjaesthetics/ayi003 |
| OpenAlex | W1990430125 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
I argue that intentionalism in aesthetics and in legal interpretation is vulnerable to a different sort of criticism than is found in the voluminous literature on the topic. Specifically, a kind of paradox arises for the intentionalist out of recognition of a second-order intention embedded in the social practices that characterize both art and law. The paper shows how this second-order intention manifests itself in each of the two enterprises, and argues that its presence entails the overriding centrality of the public text, and hence a rejection of the interpretive stance distinctive of intentionalism itself
Aesthetics · Art · Free Will and Agency · Law in Society and Culture · Legal principles and applications
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,19 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |