Motivational Internalism and Disinterestedness

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4160752
AutoresRyan P Doran (0000-0003-3986-4693, University of Cambridge, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume65
Fascículo1
Páginas61-80
Data de publicação2025-01-22
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/aesthj/ayae018
OpenAlexW4404334839
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas41

According to the most important objection to the existence of moral beauty, true judgements of moral beauty are not possible as moral judgements require being motivated to act in line with the moral judgement made, and judgements of beauty require not being motivated to act in any way. Here, I clarify the argument underlying the objection and demonstrate that it does not show that moral beauty does not exist. I present two responses: namely, that the beauty of moral beauty does not lie in the moral goodness per se (the 'adjacent properties' response), and that only a dispositional motivation to act is required for the moral judgements that are typically made as part of judgements of moral beauty, whereas aesthetic judgements only rule out state motivations to act (the 'equivocation of motivation required' response). In addressing the objection, I show how moral beauty is consistent with disinterestedness, and so should be accepted more widely; also clarifying where the beauty in moral beauty resides, and how the moral-aesthetic distinction should be drawn

Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment