Fiction and Emotion

The Puzzle of Divergent Norms

Bibliographic Data

ID4160809
AuthorsSarah Friend (0000-0001-7791-8467, Birkbeck, University of London, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume60
Issue4
Pages403-418
Publication date2020-10-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/aesthj/ayaa010
OpenAlexW3016092570
LanguageEN
Citations received10

A familiar question in the literature on emotional responses to fiction, originally put forward by Colin Radford, is how such responses can be rational. How can we make sense of pitying Anna Karenina when we know there is no such person? In this paper I argue that contrary to the usual interpretation, the question of rationality has nothing to do with the Paradox of Fiction. Instead, the real problem is why there is a divergence in our normative assessments of emotions in different contexts. I argue that explaining this divergence requires a more nuanced account of the rationality of emotion than has previously been proposed. One advantage of my proposal over alternatives is that it helps to explain one way we can learn emotionally from fiction and imagination

Divergence (linguistics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Normative · Nothing · Rationality · Sociology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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