The Second Intifada

A Dual Strategy Arena

Bibliographic Data

ID4180215
AuthorsNada Matta (0000-0002-8465-2393, New York University), René Rojas (0000-0001-9523-590X, New York University)
Year2016
Volume57
Issue1
Pages65-113
Publication date2016-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9756 • E-ISSN: 1474-0583
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003975616000035
OpenAlexW2317095301
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited43

Dominant theories fail to explain the use of terror during the Second Palestinian Intifada. Notably, they fail to explain Hamas's abandonment of suicide attacks by 2005. We classified the universe of fatalities on both sides and examined the conflict's patterns of lethal violence. Our analysis of fatality ratios and rates of change by fatality category supports a dual-arena theory of terror. Noting a rapid increase of indiscriminate Israeli civilian deaths and a relative evening out within this category in the conflict's initial phase, we demonstrate that externally Hamas aimed to improve the balance of forces to compel Israel to negotiate on equal terms using the "out-suffering" mechanism. Internally, Hamas used terror to build confrontational capacity by attracting Palestinian factions to a resistance pole and isolating conciliatory elites. When their continued deployment became too costly relative to emerging options, the campaign was swiftly called off. In the end, while based on strategic calculations, Hamas's use of terror proved to be a failure

Abandonment (legal) · Balance (ability) · Criminology · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Resistance (ecology) · Sociology · Software deployment · Engineering · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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