Investment preferences and patient capital

Financing, Governance, and Regulation in Pension Fund Capitalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4237441
AutoresMichael A Mccarthy (0000-0003-1039-7980, Marquette University), Ville-Pekka Sorsa (0000-0002-8539-092X, Hanken School of Economics, autor de correspondencia), Natascha Van Der Zwan (0000-0002-7967-0757, Leiden University)
Año2016
Volumen14
Número4
Páginas751-769
Fecha de publicación2016-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocio-Economic Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1475-1461 • E-ISSN: 1475-147X
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ser/mww020
OpenAlexW2511846178
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas36
Referencias citadas34

In comparative political economy, the patience of capital investment has often been explained with the political activity of stakeholders. Such scholarship attributes investment preferences to either set assumptions about what various actors are likely to want from their pension systems or to macro-level institutional factors. Comparing the preferences of business and labor actors in the occupational pension systems in Finland, the Netherlands, and the USA, we argue that preferences are better explained more dynamically and emerge from meso-level institutional forces. We find that financing needs and capacities, governance capacities and financial regulations explain changes in labor and business preferences with regard to fund investment. In each of the cases, a combination of these three institutional factors explains a preference shift toward more varied and more impatient investing.

Capital (architecture) · Capitalism · Corporate governance · Economic growth · Economics · Investment (military) · Investment fund · Investment management · Microeconomics · Patience · Pension · Pension Fund · Political science · Politics · Preference · Scholarship · Finance · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Social Policy and Reform Studies