What role can information play in improved equity in Pakistan's irrigation system? Evidence from an experimental game in Punjab
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4238702 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Reid Bell (0000-0002-1164-312X, New York University), Muhammad Azeem Ali Shah (0000-0001-5277-5893), Arif Anwar (0000-0002-8609-4188), Arif A Anwar (0000-0002-3071-3197), Claudia Ringler (0000-0002-8266-0488, International Food Policy Research Institute) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Conservation Ecology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1195-5449 • E-ISSN: 1708-3087 |
| Publisher | Resilience Alliance (PUBLISHER • CA) |
| DOI | 10.5751/es-07368-200151 |
| OpenAlex | W2313863085 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 7 |
Bell, A. R., M. A. A. Shah, A. Anwar, and C. Ringler. 2015. What role can information play in improved equity in Pakistan’s irrigation system? Evidence from an experimental game in Punjab. Ecology and Society 20(1): 51. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07368-200151
Biology · Economics · Irrigation · Political science · Law · Water resources management and optimization · Ecology
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Pakistan’s Water Economy
Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2022 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |