Democracy, Representation, and Self-Rule in the Indian Constitution

India is a union of 28 states and 7 Union Territories. Several of its states and sub-state national communities have since the time of independence complained of inadequate representation in the Union, violating their right to self-rule. There exists persistent resentment against the present constitutional setup. This paper examines the failures and potential of federalism and bicameralism as strategies to promote self-rule in India among sub-state communities and reconcile it with the ideal of equal representation. These two strategies seek to promote the coexistence of diverse communities by meeting the demands of self-rule, while uniting them at the national level. The paper first looks at Indian federalism, and particularly Indian asymmetric federalism. In theory, Indian federalism seeks to promote the value of self-rule. However, in practice, it fails to accomplish its objective. It also creates institutions based on ethnic identities that disproportionately empower sub-state national communities, simultaneously disempowering other individuals and groups. The paper then turns to Indian bicameralism. In its limited design, the Indian upper house does little to reduce the fissiparous tendencies of sub-state communities in India. Moreover, the current theory of bicameralism seems to allow little opportunity for bicameralism to address these problems in India. However, bicameralism can be further developed theoretically as an institutional mechanism to foster self-rule among sub-state communities in fractious countries - in effect as a middle ground between the theories of federalism and consociation. Applying this theoretical model in practice to the Indian upper house would have potential benefits. A restructured Indian upper house that represents sub-state national communities equally could increase the ability of these communities to participate meaningfully in their own rule, while remaining within the ideal of proportional representation

Constitution · Constitution of India · Democracy · Dual federalism · Federalism · Independence (probability theory · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rule of law · Sociology · State (computer science · Law · South Asian Studies and Conflicts · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

• A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition

  Robert A Dahl•Preface to Democratic Theory•2006

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