"Wittgenstein and the Intricate Evasions of "Is

N REMARK 109 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says the following about the kind of investigation that he is involved in: may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with explanation, and alone must take its place.' This is an astonishing proposal. I think there is nothing else like it in the history of Western thought. Husserl said things that sound similar, and it's even conceivable that his project of influenced Wittgenstein, but Husserl's way of conceiving description turns out to be fairly traditional compared to Wittgenstein's. In fact, a good way of seeing just how radical Wittgenstein's project is, is to contrast it with Husserl's, as Anthony Manser has done in an illuminating exchange with Ernst Tugendhat.2 Radical or not, however, isn't Wittgenstein naive to think that he can banish theory and purely describe? If there is one thing we know today, isn't it that perception is interpretive, Is it really clear, though, what it means to say all is theory-laden? It's one of those heady formulas that give us an impression of mastery over a large field of phenomena, a sense of postKantian sophistication. But the word description is not used only one way-it has many different uses, and the formula all is theory-laden would have to be applied differently in different cases, and would be irrelevant in others. In order to remind yourself of the grammar of the concept of description, think of the differences in what counts as a in these cases

Epistemology · Sociology · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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