Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives

Bibliographic Data

ID4289218
AuthorsLouis Fisher (0000-0002-0295-3812, corresponding author)
Year1994
Volume109
Issue5
Pages739-762
Publication date1994-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Science Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3195 • E-ISSN: 1538-165X
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2152530
OpenAlexW2012849545
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Over the past fifty years, presidential war power has continued to expand beyond the model adopted by the Founding Fathers, notwithstanding substantial efforts by Congress since the 1970s to restore a better balance. In recent years, Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton have both insisted that they may involve the nation in major military initiatives (Bush in Iraq and Clinton in Bosnia and Haiti) without first seeking congressional authority. To an increasing extent, presidents solicit from the UN Security Council but not from Congress. The concentration of power in the executive branch is dangerous not only to Congress and the country but to the presidency. With few exceptions, presidents from Harry Truman to Clinton have been damaged by unilateral exercises of the war power. For constitutional, political, and partisan reasons, presidents need to obtain congressional authority in advance before engaging the country in military conflicts. The drift of the war power from Congress to the president after World War II is unmistakable. The Framers' design, deliberately placing in Congress the decision to expend the nation's blood and treasure, has been radically transformed. Presidents now regularly claim that the Commander in Chief Clause empowers them to send American

Political science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Military and Defense Studies · Public Administration

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