The De-Institutionalization of Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4293699 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony J Chergosky (American Red Cross), Jason M Roberts (0000-0001-8113-1827, United States Congress) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 133 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 475-495 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Science Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3195 • E-ISSN: 1538-165X |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1002/polq.12800 |
| OpenAlex | W2890178555 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
THE FRAMERS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION designed the Congress as the most powerful branch of the new government. The institution was granted wide authority over crucial governmental functions such as taxing, spending, and war making. The Framers did not design the institution to be efficient, however. The two chambers were given differing electoral rules, and they diverge starkly in how seats are allocated to the several states.1 To make use of its great powers, Congress must find concurrent agreement across the two chambers and gain the assent of a president who is chosen independently of the legislature. This makes lawmaking an inherently adversarial process. As a result, Congress has been beset by conflict and periods of gridlock throughout its history. One consequence of this is that Congress has consistently been the least popular branch of the U.S. government.2 Citizens are turned off by much of what Congress does, including passing laws, failing to pass laws, and the conflictual process that is a natural consequence of investing power in a large body responsible for representing diverse interests.3
Adversarial system · Constitution · Government (linguistics) · Gridlock · Institution · Institutionalisation · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Separation of powers · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Public Administration
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |