Are Two Knaves Better Than One? Hume, Buchanan, and Musgrave on Economics and Government

Bibliographic Data

ID4298087
AuthorsAndrew Farrant (0000-0003-1793-3045, Trinity University), Maria Pia Paganelli (0000-0002-5796-4519, Trinity University)
Year2005
Volume37
IssueSuppl_1
Pages71-90
Publication date2005-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0018-2702 • E-ISSN: 1527-1919
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00182702-37-suppl_1-71
OpenAlexW1559171655
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited12

It is commonplace to view market agents as self-interested knaves, while government agents are either as knaves or public-spirited angels. What are the consequences of these different motivational assumptions in modeling governmental and market behavior? We compare David Hume, James M. Buchanan, and Richard Musgrave. We claim that Hume, the only one thinking consistently in terms of the worst-case, offers a second best solution for both the government and the economy, which may turn out to be the best possible solution given human nature. Because of the reciprocal check, two knaves are better than one. More is preferred to less even with vices

Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Neoclassical economics · Positive economics · Public economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics