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Modigliani's and Simon's Early Contributions to Uncertainty (1952-61)

Bibliographic Data

ID4298722
AuthorsAntonella Rancan (0000-0003-0481-1639, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume45
Issue1
Pages1-38
Publication date2013-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0018-2702 • E-ISSN: 1527-1919
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00182702-1965177
OpenAlexW1991138851
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited38

This article reconstructs Franco Modigliani's and Herbert Simon's close collaboration over the 1950s on implementation of a decision theory under uncertainty that partly contributed to the genesis of behavioral economics and rational expectations theory. Their collaboration reveals how the shared identification of uncertainty as a major problem, their similar interpretation of rationality as the ability to select and use relevant information, and their embrace of certain methodological norms for the construction of economic theory (that it should be empirically grounded and mathematically sophisticated) enabled productive cross-fertilization between the two approaches in their nascent forms. In the beginning Modigliani's forward-looking procedure (with its focus on foresight) and Simon's backward-looking model (with its focus on learning) were conceived as complementary rather than antithetical for the development of a concrete decision rule under the hypothesis of incomplete information. The article also discusses Modigliani's and Emile Grunberg's contribution to rational expectations, concentrating on the paper they wrote but never published, and Modigliani's early reaction to John Muth's rational expectations theory

Decision theory · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Futures studies · Identification (biology · Interpretation (philosophy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Positive economics · Rational expectations · Rationality · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,5
Citation span2014 - 2024 (11)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 6

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