Thoughtlessness as an Intellectual Vice in Kierkegaard and Aristotle

Bibliographic Data

ID4314392
AuthorsEleanor Helms (California Polytechnic State University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume14
Issue11
Pages1401
Publication date2023-11-09
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligions (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/rel14111401
OpenAlexW4388525436
LanguageEN
References cited21

I examine the Kierkegaardian intellectual vice of thoughtlessness (Tankeløshed) and its opposite, the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of phronēsis, or practical wisdom. I argue that thoughtlessness is primarily an intellectual problem rather than a moral one. My emphasis on intellectual virtue in Kierkegaard contrasts with more typical characterizations of passion, will, and action as Kierkegaard's main concerns and reliance on intellect as an obstacle to be overcome. Drawing on Aristotle's account of phronēsis as the intellectual virtue related to action, I show that Kierkegaard offers a rich account of practical wisdom and a critique of its opposite, thoughtlessness. I conclude that, since there are different kinds of wisdom, Kierkegaard can say that faith is not a form of knowledge in the sense of epistēmē, or scientific knowledge, while preserving a central role for intellect in the task and life of faith

Epistemology · Faith · Intellect · Passion · Virtue · Kierkegaardian Philosophy and Influence · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access