By Leibniz's Law
Remarks on a Fallacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351141 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin Schnieder (0000-0001-8565-2953, Universität Hamburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 222 |
| Pages | 39-54 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00427.x |
| OpenAlex | W2006705603 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 5 |
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. I then argue that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Fallacy · Inference · Variety (cybernetics) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism
People and places
The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being
Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars
Pure Russellians are allowed not to believe
Why fuss about these quirks of the vernacular? Propositional attitude sentences in Prior’s nachlass
Groups as pluralities
Arguments by Leibniz's Law in Metaphysics
The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2024 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |