Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire

Bibliographic Data

ID4351179
AuthorsEmily C Mcwilliams (0000-0002-8609-070X, Duke Kunshan University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume73
Issue4
Pages965-982
Publication date2023-09-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqad061
OpenAlexW4380729615
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited36

Are there epistemic duties to inquire? The idea enjoys intuitive support. However, prominent evidentialists argue that our only epistemic duty is to believe well (i.e., to have doxastically justified beliefs), and doing so does not require inquiry. Against this, I argue that evidentialists are plausibly committed to the idea that if we have epistemic duties to believe well, then we have epistemic duties to inquire. This is because on plausible evidentialist views of evidence possession (i.e., views that result in plausible theories of evidentialist justification), inquiry is sometimes a necessary constitutive means of forming doxastically justified beliefs-beliefs that are proportioned to and based on one's evidence. So, either evidentialist views of evidence possession commit them to epistemic duties to inquire or they lead to independently implausible theories of evidentialist justification. My discussion also has important implications for the zetetic turn in epistemology, since I argue that evidentialists who are staunchly opposed to epistemic norms on inquiry have reason to reconsider

Commit · Duty · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Possession (linguistics) · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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