Vagueness as a Modality

Bibliographic Data

ID4351180
AuthorsKen Akiba (0000-0002-3728-4639, New York University, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume50
Issue200
Pages359-370
Publication date2000-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00191
OpenAlexW4254712938
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited13

I present a modal conception of vagueness and vague objects, according to which a vague object is a transworld object which coincides with one precise object in one world and with another precise object in another world. Such worlds are called precisifications; they are modal, worldly counterparts of the precisifications postulated in supervaluationism. I criticize Evans' argument against vague objects, admitting the validity of the argument, but rejecting its basic assumption that if there are vague objects, certain identity statements must be indefinite in truth value. I distinguish identity from coincidence, and claim that if there are vague objects, some statements of coincidence will be indefinite in truth‐value, not statements of identity. To establish this point, I compare vagueness with temporal modality

Aesthetics · Argument (complex analysis · Coincidence · Epistemology · Fuzzy logic · Identity (music · Library science · Linguistics · Modal · Modality (human–computer interaction · Object (grammar · Possible world · Truth value · Vagueness · Value (mathematics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation

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